1. Policy Statement
Al-Waris Foundation depends on digital systems to support its charitable activities, administration, fundraising, communications, financial management and project delivery.
The charity is committed to protecting its:
- information;
- accounts;
- systems;
- donor information;
- beneficiary information;
- financial information;
- credentials;
- digital assets.
Information security should be proportionate to the charity's size, activities, resources and risks.
Security controls must protect the charity without unnecessarily preventing legitimate charitable work.
2. Purpose
This policy establishes Al-Waris Foundation's approach to:
- account security;
- passwords;
- multi-factor authentication;
- access control;
- email security;
- website security;
- payment systems;
- devices;
- software;
- cloud services;
- backups;
- personal data;
- cyber incidents;
- phishing;
- malware;
- third-party services;
- administrator access;
- security monitoring;
- recovery.
3. Scope
This policy applies to trustees, staff where applicable, volunteers, contractors and other authorised persons who access Al-Waris Foundation information or systems.
It covers systems including:
- charity email;
- website;
- administration systems;
- content-management systems;
- donor systems;
- payment systems;
- cloud storage;
- databases;
- social-media accounts;
- computers;
- mobile devices;
- project records;
- financial systems.
4. Trustee Responsibility
The Board of Trustees retains overall responsibility for ensuring that significant information-security risks are appropriately managed.
Trustees should ensure that:
- proportionate security controls exist;
- significant incidents are escalated;
- personal data is protected;
- critical systems have appropriate access controls;
- major security risks are reviewed.
Technical and operational security may be delegated to appropriately authorised persons.
5. Security Principles
Al-Waris Foundation will seek to apply the following principles:
Confidentiality
Information should only be accessible to people who legitimately require it.
Integrity
Information should be protected from unauthorised or accidental alteration.
Availability
Important systems and information should remain reasonably available when required.
Least Privilege
Users should receive only the access reasonably required for their role.
Accountability
Material system actions should be attributable where reasonably practicable.
Defence in Depth
Critical systems should not depend upon a single security control where additional proportionate safeguards are available.
6. Information Classification
Information should be handled according to its sensitivity.
Information may broadly be treated as:
- Public;
- Internal;
- Confidential;
- Highly Sensitive.
7. Public Information
Public information may include:
- published policies;
- public project updates;
- charity contact details;
- approved reports;
- public website content.
Public information may still require integrity protection to prevent unauthorised alteration.
8. Internal Information
Internal information may include:
- operational procedures;
- routine internal communications;
- non-sensitive administrative records;
- unpublished content.
It should not automatically be made public.
9. Confidential Information
Confidential information may include:
- donor information;
- volunteer records;
- complaints;
- financial records;
- contractor information;
- internal governance information;
- unpublished project information.
Access should be limited according to legitimate need.
10. Highly Sensitive Information
Highly sensitive information may include:
- passwords;
- authentication secrets;
- API keys;
- payment credentials;
- safeguarding records;
- security keys;
- recovery codes;
- certain beneficiary information;
- encryption keys.
Such information requires enhanced protection.
11. Access Control
Access to systems must be authorised.
Permissions should reflect:
- role;
- responsibility;
- operational need;
- sensitivity of information.
Access should not be provided merely because a person is associated with the charity.
12. Trustee System Access
Being a trustee does not automatically require operational access to every Al-Waris Foundation system.
Where trustees do not perform operational functions, they may receive governance information without receiving:
- website administration;
- payment-system access;
- donor database access;
- operational email access;
- technical infrastructure access.
This supports least-privilege security.
13. Administrative Access
Administrator privileges should be limited to people who genuinely require them.
Administrative accounts should receive enhanced protection because compromise may permit:
- content alteration;
- data access;
- user management;
- security changes;
- financial manipulation.
14. Role-Based Access
Where supported, systems should use role-based permissions.
Roles may distinguish between functions such as:
- administration;
- content management;
- donations;
- projects;
- volunteers;
- complaints;
- governance;
- finance;
- system management.
Custom permissions may be used where appropriate.
15. Shared Accounts
Shared accounts should be avoided where individual accounts are reasonably available.
Individual accounts improve:
- accountability;
- revocation;
- auditability;
- incident investigation.
Where a shared account is unavoidable, credentials must be securely controlled.
16. Account Creation
New system accounts should only be created where there is a legitimate need.
Access should be approved according to the sensitivity of the system.
17. Access Removal
Access should be removed or changed promptly when a person:
- leaves the charity;
- changes role;
- no longer requires access;
- has access suspended;
- presents a security concern.
Critical access should not remain active indefinitely after it is no longer required.
18. Periodic Access Review
The charity should periodically review access to significant systems.
Reviews should consider:
- inactive accounts;
- unnecessary administrators;
- former volunteers;
- outdated permissions;
- unrecognised users.
19. Passwords
Passwords should be sufficiently strong for the system concerned.
Users should prefer:
- long passwords;
- unique passwords;
- passphrases;
- password-manager-generated credentials.
Simple or easily guessed passwords should not be used for significant charity systems.
20. Password Reuse
Passwords protecting important charity systems should not be reused across unrelated services.
A compromise of one service should not automatically compromise multiple charity accounts.
21. Password Managers
The charity encourages the use of reputable password managers for managing complex and unique credentials.
Password-manager access should itself be strongly protected.
22. Password Sharing
Passwords should not normally be sent through:
- ordinary email;
- SMS;
- public messaging channels;
- shared documents.
Where credentials must be transferred, an appropriately secure method should be used.
23. Multi-Factor Authentication
Multi-factor authentication should be enabled for significant systems where supported.
It should be strongly prioritised for:
- email;
- website administration;
- hosting;
- domain management;
- payment processors;
- banking;
- cloud storage;
- social media;
- source-code repositories;
- database administration.
24. MFA for Privileged Users
Administrative or otherwise privileged accounts should normally be required to use MFA where the service supports it.
A password alone should not be relied upon for critical administrative systems where stronger authentication is reasonably available.
25. Authentication Methods
Stronger authentication methods should be preferred where practicable.
Depending on the service, these may include:
- security keys;
- passkeys;
- authenticator applications;
- other phishing-resistant authentication.
SMS authentication may still be used where stronger options are unavailable or impractical.
26. Recovery Codes
Recovery codes should be stored securely.
They should not be stored openly alongside the password they are intended to recover.
27. Account Recovery
Critical accounts should have appropriate recovery arrangements.
Recovery should not depend entirely on a single:
- person's device;
- email account;
- phone number;
where loss of that item could permanently prevent the charity from accessing an essential system.
28. Email Security
Email is a major security risk because attackers may impersonate:
- trustees;
- suppliers;
- donors;
- payment providers;
- banks;
- contractors;
- technology services.
Users should treat unexpected or unusual requests cautiously.
29. Official Email Accounts
Official Al-Waris Foundation email addresses should be used for charity business where appropriate.
Different mailboxes may be used for functions such as:
- general enquiries;
- donations;
- volunteering;
- support;
- administration;
- other operational purposes.
Access should be granted according to responsibility.
30. Email Routing
Automated communications should be routed to appropriate official mailboxes according to their purpose.
For example:
- donation matters should route to the appropriate donations function;
- volunteer enquiries should route to the volunteer function;
- support matters should route to support;
- general enquiries should route to the appropriate general mailbox.
Routing should be centrally managed where practicable.
31. Phishing
Users should be alert to phishing indicators including:
- unexpected login links;
- urgent payment requests;
- changed bank details;
- unusual attachments;
- fake password-reset requests;
- unexpected MFA prompts;
- requests for credentials.
Suspicious communications should be verified independently.
32. Business Email Compromise
Requests involving:
- bank-detail changes;
- large payments;
- unusual refunds;
- credential disclosure;
- urgent financial transfers;
should receive additional verification where appropriate.
Email alone should not always be treated as sufficient evidence for a high-risk financial instruction.
33. Suspicious Links
Users should avoid entering charity credentials after following an unexpected or suspicious link.
Where possible, the known official service should be accessed directly.
34. Email Attachments
Unexpected attachments should be treated cautiously.
Files that may contain executable code or macros require particular care.
35. Domain Security
The charity's internet domain is a critical asset.
Domain-management accounts should have:
- strong authentication;
- restricted access;
- MFA where supported;
- accurate recovery information.
Unauthorised domain changes can compromise the charity's website and email simultaneously.
36. DNS Security
DNS configuration should only be modified by authorised persons.
Material changes should be reviewed carefully, particularly changes involving:
- website routing;
- email routing;
- verification records;
- security records.
37. Email Authentication
Where reasonably supported, Al-Waris Foundation should maintain appropriate email authentication controls such as:
- SPF;
- DKIM;
- DMARC.
These controls can reduce unauthorised use of the charity's domain for email impersonation.
38. Website Security
The charity website should be designed and operated using proportionate security practices.
These should include where relevant:
- secure authentication;
- access controls;
- input validation;
- dependency management;
- HTTPS;
- security headers;
- secure database access;
- secret management;
- testing.
39. HTTPS
Public website traffic involving personal or sensitive information should use HTTPS.
HTTP traffic should normally redirect securely to HTTPS where appropriate.
40. Website Administration
Administrative functionality should not be exposed unnecessarily.
Admin access should require authentication and appropriate authorisation.
Sensitive administrative actions may require stronger controls.
41. CMS Permissions
Content-management permissions should distinguish between users who can:
- draft;
- review;
- publish;
- administer;
where proportionate.
Content editing rights should not automatically grant full system administration.
42. Draft and Publication Controls
Where supported, public content should use controlled workflows such as:
- draft;
- preview;
- review;
- scheduled publication;
- publication;
- archive.
This reduces accidental or unauthorised public changes.
43. Version History
Material CMS content should retain version history where reasonably practicable.
This allows the charity to:
- identify changes;
- investigate mistakes;
- restore earlier content;
- maintain accountability.
44. Database Security
Databases should not provide unrestricted public access to confidential information.
Controls may include:
- authentication;
- row-level security;
- service-role separation;
- restricted administrative credentials;
- validated application access.
45. Public Database Access
Where a public website legitimately reads information directly from a backend service, public access should be restricted to information intended for publication.
Draft, private, administrative or sensitive records must not become publicly accessible merely because they share the same database.
46. Production and Development
Where reasonably practicable, production systems should be separated from:
- development;
- testing;
- local environments.
Testing should not unnecessarily alter live charity information.
47. Live Payment Systems
Changes to live payment infrastructure require particular care.
Development or testing must not unintentionally:
- create real charges;
- change live payment routing;
- alter production donation configuration;
- expose live secrets.
Test environments should be used where supported.
48. Payment Security
The charity should minimise direct handling of payment-card information.
Where possible, regulated payment providers should handle card processing.
The charity should not store full card details unless there is a legitimate requirement and appropriate compliance framework.
49. Payment Provider Accounts
Payment-provider accounts should use:
- strong unique credentials;
- MFA;
- restricted access;
- appropriate role separation;
- monitoring.
Live credentials must be treated as highly sensitive.
50. Webhooks
Payment and other webhooks should be authenticated or cryptographically verified where the provider supports this.
An incoming request should not automatically be trusted merely because it claims to originate from a payment provider.
51. API Keys and Secrets
Secrets must not be intentionally committed to:
- public repositories;
- source code intended for publication;
- documentation;
- client-side code;
unless the credential is specifically designed to be public.
52. Environment Variables
Sensitive configuration should be managed using appropriate environment or secret-management systems.
Production secrets should be separated from development configuration where appropriate.
53. Public Environment Variables
Variables intentionally exposed to client-side applications must never contain secrets.
A variable being labelled as an environment variable does not make it confidential if the application sends it to the browser.
54. Source-Code Repositories
Repository access should be limited according to legitimate development and governance needs.
Repositories should use appropriate:
- authentication;
- MFA where supported;
- branch protections where proportionate;
- secret scanning;
- dependency monitoring.
55. Code Review
Material security-sensitive changes should receive proportionate review before production deployment.
This is particularly important for changes involving:
- authentication;
- permissions;
- payments;
- database access;
- secrets;
- donor information.
56. Automated Testing
Where practicable, software changes should be validated through appropriate automated testing.
This may include:
- linting;
- type checking;
- unit tests;
- integration tests;
- database tests;
- browser tests;
- production builds;
- security checks.
Automated testing does not replace appropriate human review.
57. Dependency Security
Software dependencies should be monitored for known vulnerabilities.
Critical or materially exploitable vulnerabilities should be addressed according to risk.
Not every low-severity advisory requires emergency action.
58. Security Scanning
Development workflows may use proportionate automated checks such as:
- dependency audits;
- secret scanning;
- code-quality checks;
- vulnerability scanning.
Security tools should support rather than replace appropriate judgement.
59. Deployment Security
Production deployments should occur through authorised processes.
Where practicable:
- changes should be version controlled;
- deployments should be attributable;
- production configuration should be protected;
- rollback should be possible.
60. Hosting
Hosting accounts should receive strong protection because compromise may allow an attacker to:
- alter the website;
- access configuration;
- redirect traffic;
- disrupt services.
Administrative hosting access should therefore be tightly controlled.
61. Cloud Services
Before using significant cloud services, Al-Waris Foundation should consider:
- security;
- privacy;
- access control;
- availability;
- data location where relevant;
- backup;
- termination arrangements.
62. Third-Party Providers
Third-party services may include:
- hosting;
- payment processors;
- email providers;
- analytics;
- databases;
- file storage;
- communication platforms.
The charity should apply proportionate due diligence according to the sensitivity and importance of the service.
63. Analytics
Analytics systems should be configured in a manner consistent with:
- privacy;
- cookie requirements;
- data minimisation;
- access control.
Analytics accounts should not receive broader access to personal information than reasonably required.
64. Consent-Gated Analytics
Where applicable consent is required for non-essential analytics, the analytics technology should not be activated before valid consent.
Withdrawal of consent should be respected appropriately.
See the Data Protection and UK GDPR Policy and Cookie Policy where applicable.
65. Social Media Accounts
Official social-media accounts are charity digital assets.
They should use:
- strong authentication;
- MFA where available;
- restricted administrative access;
- appropriate recovery information.
Personal credentials should not become the charity's only means of recovering an important account where avoidable.
66. Social Media Access
Access should be removed when a person no longer manages the charity's social media.
Passwords should be changed where necessary following:
- staff or volunteer departure;
- suspected compromise;
- inappropriate sharing.
67. Devices
Devices used to access confidential charity information should have proportionate protection.
This may include:
- screen lock;
- device password or PIN;
- current software;
- encryption;
- anti-malware controls where appropriate;
- remote wipe where supported.
68. Personal Devices
Personal devices may be used for charity activity where appropriately secure.
Users should take reasonable steps to prevent:
- unauthorised family or third-party access;
- loss of confidential data;
- uncontrolled backups;
- exposure through insecure applications.
69. Lost or Stolen Devices
Loss or theft of a device containing or providing access to charity information should be reported promptly.
Actions may include:
- revoking sessions;
- changing passwords;
- remote wipe;
- assessing personal-data exposure;
- notifying relevant providers.
70. Device Disposal
Before disposing of or transferring a device used for charity activity, confidential information should be securely removed where reasonably practicable.
Simply deleting visible files may not always securely erase them.
71. Software Updates
Supported security updates should be installed within a reasonable period according to risk.
Critical security updates may require accelerated action.
72. Unsupported Software
Unsupported operating systems or software should not be used for sensitive charity activity where doing so creates an unreasonable security risk.
Where replacement cannot occur immediately, compensating controls should be considered.
73. Malware
Reasonable precautions should be taken against:
- malware;
- ransomware;
- malicious browser extensions;
- infected attachments;
- unauthorised software.
Suspicious devices may need to be disconnected from charity systems pending investigation.
74. Software Installation
Users should avoid installing unnecessary or untrusted software on devices used for sensitive charity activities.
Particular caution should be exercised with:
- cracked software;
- unknown browser extensions;
- unofficial applications;
- software from untrusted download sources.
75. Public Wi-Fi
Sensitive activity over untrusted public Wi-Fi should be avoided or appropriately protected.
Users should exercise particular caution when accessing:
- banking;
- payment systems;
- admin systems;
- confidential records.
76. Physical Security
Information security also depends on physical controls.
Reasonable measures may include:
- locking devices;
- securing paper records;
- restricting access to offices;
- avoiding unattended confidential information.
77. Screen Privacy
Confidential or highly sensitive information should not be unnecessarily displayed where unauthorised people can view it.
78. Removable Media
USB drives and other removable storage should be used cautiously.
Sensitive information should not be copied to uncontrolled removable media without a legitimate reason.
79. Encryption
Appropriate encryption should be used for sensitive information where reasonably necessary.
Encryption may apply to:
- devices;
- stored files;
- communications;
- backups.
80. Backups
Important information should have proportionate backup arrangements.
Backups should reflect:
- business importance;
- recovery requirements;
- data sensitivity;
- likelihood of loss.
81. Backup Separation
Where practicable, critical backups should not depend entirely upon the same account or system as the primary data.
This reduces the risk that one compromise destroys both live data and recovery copies.
82. Backup Testing
Critical backup arrangements should be tested periodically where practicable.
A backup should not be assumed usable merely because a system reports that it exists.
83. Data Minimisation
The charity should avoid retaining unnecessary personal information.
Reducing unnecessary data also reduces the potential impact of a security breach.
84. Data Sharing
Confidential information should only be shared where there is a legitimate reason.
Recipients should receive only the information reasonably necessary.
85. File Sharing
Sensitive files should not be made publicly accessible merely for convenience.
Where links are used, appropriate access restrictions should be considered.
86. Beneficiary Information
Beneficiary information may create particular risks if exposed.
Records should avoid unnecessary collection of:
- identification documents;
- precise addresses;
- medical information;
- financial hardship information;
- information about children;
unless genuinely required.
87. Safeguarding Information
Safeguarding information requires enhanced confidentiality.
Access should be restricted to people with a legitimate safeguarding or governance need.
Security controls must not prevent urgent safeguarding information from reaching the appropriate person.
88. Donor Information
Donor information should be protected from unauthorised access or disclosure.
Donation history, contact details and payment-related information should only be available to appropriately authorised users.
89. Financial Information
Financial information including:
- banking details;
- supplier bank accounts;
- payment records;
- financial reports;
should receive appropriate protection.
90. Exported Data
Data exports may create additional security risk because they can bypass normal application access controls.
Exports containing confidential information should be:
- authorised;
- stored securely;
- shared carefully;
- deleted when no longer required.
91. Audit Logs
Significant systems should maintain appropriate audit logs where supported.
Logs may record:
- logins;
- permission changes;
- content publication;
- financial actions;
- administrative changes;
- security events.
92. Log Access
Security and audit logs may themselves contain sensitive information.
Access should be appropriately restricted.
Logs should not record passwords or unnecessary secrets.
93. Monitoring
The charity may use proportionate monitoring to identify:
- suspicious logins;
- unauthorised changes;
- failed authentication;
- unusual administrative activity;
- security failures.
Monitoring should remain consistent with privacy and data-protection obligations.
94. Cybersecurity Incidents
A cybersecurity incident may include:
- account compromise;
- malware;
- ransomware;
- unauthorised access;
- data theft;
- website defacement;
- phishing compromise;
- credential exposure;
- denial of service;
- payment-system compromise.
95. Immediate Incident Response
Where a significant cyber incident is suspected, appropriate immediate actions may include:
- protecting people and essential services;
- containing the incident;
- preserving relevant evidence;
- revoking compromised credentials;
- isolating affected systems;
- assessing affected information;
- recovering safely;
- considering reporting obligations.
Actions should be proportionate to the incident.
96. Credential Compromise
Where a password or authentication credential is suspected to be compromised:
- change or revoke it promptly;
- terminate active sessions where possible;
- review recent activity;
- assess connected accounts;
- strengthen authentication.
Reusing the compromised password elsewhere increases the scope of the response required.
97. Email Account Compromise
Where an email account is compromised, the response should consider:
- password reset;
- MFA reset;
- active sessions;
- forwarding rules;
- recovery settings;
- sent messages;
- connected services;
- impersonation risk.
Attackers may create hidden forwarding or mailbox rules, so changing the password alone may be insufficient.
98. Website Compromise
Where the website is compromised, the charity should consider:
- taking affected functionality offline;
- preserving evidence;
- rotating secrets;
- reviewing deployments;
- restoring from a trusted state;
- reviewing administrator accounts;
- assessing data exposure.
99. Ransomware
If ransomware is suspected:
- affected systems should be isolated where safe;
- evidence should be preserved;
- professional assistance should be considered;
- backups should be assessed before restoration.
Payment of a ransom should not be treated as a routine solution and may create legal, sanctions and practical risks.
100. Personal Data Breaches
A security incident involving personal data must also be assessed under the Data Protection and UK GDPR Policy.
The charity should determine:
- what data was affected;
- whose data was affected;
- likely consequences;
- containment;
- whether notification is required.
101. ICO Notification
Where a personal-data breach meets the applicable legal threshold for notification to the Information Commissioner's Office, it should be reported within the required timeframe.
Current legal requirements should be checked when an incident occurs.
102. Notification to Individuals
Where applicable law requires affected individuals to be informed, communications should be:
- clear;
- accurate;
- timely;
- proportionate.
The charity should not conceal a serious breach merely to avoid reputational harm.
103. Charity Commission Reporting
A significant cyber incident may also constitute a serious incident for charity-regulatory purposes.
Trustees should assess the incident under the Serious Incident Reporting Policy.
104. Law Enforcement
The charity may report cybercrime, fraud or extortion to appropriate law-enforcement or reporting bodies where necessary.
105. Incident Records
Significant security incidents should be documented.
Records may include:
- date;
- discovery;
- affected systems;
- actions;
- information affected;
- decisions;
- reporting;
- recovery;
- lessons learned.
106. Post-Incident Review
Following a significant incident, the charity should consider:
- root cause;
- failed controls;
- effectiveness of response;
- required technical changes;
- required policy changes;
- training needs.
107. Business Continuity
Critical digital services should be considered within the charity's continuity planning.
The charity should understand how it would continue essential functions if a key system became unavailable.
108. Recovery Priorities
Following a major outage or cyber incident, recovery should prioritise systems according to charitable and operational importance.
Examples may include:
- communications;
- financial access;
- donation processing;
- critical beneficiary records;
- website availability.
109. Artificial Intelligence Tools
AI tools may support legitimate charity activities.
Users must consider security before providing AI systems with confidential information.
Highly sensitive information should not be entered into an external AI service unless the use has been appropriately assessed and authorised.
110. AI and Personal Data
Personal data supplied to AI systems must be handled consistently with the Data Protection and UK GDPR Policy.
Where possible, unnecessary personal identifiers should be removed before using external AI tools.
111. AI-Generated Code
AI-generated software should not be assumed secure merely because it was generated automatically.
Material code should undergo appropriate:
- review;
- testing;
- validation;
- security assessment.
112. Automated Agents
Automated development or administrative agents should receive only the access reasonably required for the task.
They should not be granted unnecessary production credentials or broad administrative access.
113. Production Changes
Automated tools must not make material production changes outside their authorised scope.
High-risk changes involving:
- live payments;
- DNS;
- authentication;
- production secrets;
- destructive database actions;
should receive appropriate approval and validation.
114. Security and Usability
Security measures should be proportionate.
Controls that are excessively difficult may encourage unsafe workarounds.
The charity should therefore seek secure processes that remain practical for legitimate users.
115. Security Training
People with access to significant systems should receive proportionate security awareness.
Topics may include:
- phishing;
- passwords;
- MFA;
- data handling;
- suspicious payments;
- incident reporting.
116. Administrator Training
People with privileged access should understand the additional risks associated with:
- administrator accounts;
- production systems;
- databases;
- payment systems;
- secrets;
- access management.
117. Reporting Security Concerns
Anyone who identifies a suspected security weakness or incident should report it promptly to an appropriate authorised person.
People should not attempt unauthorised security testing against charity systems merely because they believe a vulnerability may exist.
118. Vulnerability Reports
Good-faith vulnerability reports received from external researchers should be assessed appropriately.
The charity should:
- preserve the report;
- verify the issue;
- prioritise according to risk;
- avoid unnecessarily hostile responses to legitimate responsible disclosure.
119. Security Testing
Authorised security testing may include:
- vulnerability scanning;
- dependency scanning;
- application testing;
- penetration testing.
Testing must be appropriately scoped to avoid damaging production systems or third-party services.
120. Third-Party Breaches
If a service provider suffers a breach affecting Al-Waris Foundation, the charity should assess:
- affected data;
- affected credentials;
- operational impact;
- required notifications;
- whether continued use remains appropriate.
121. Supplier Termination
When a technology supplier relationship ends, the charity should consider:
- data export;
- deletion;
- account closure;
- credential revocation;
- access removal;
- retention requirements.
122. Records Retention
Security records should be retained in accordance with the Records Retention and Disposal Policy.
Retention periods should reflect:
- legal requirements;
- investigation needs;
- operational value;
- data minimisation.
123. Confidentiality
Information-security concerns should be shared only with people who reasonably need to know.
However, confidentiality must not be used to conceal:
- fraud;
- safeguarding failures;
- data breaches;
- serious regulatory matters.
124. Policy Breaches
Breaches of this policy may result in:
- access restriction;
- password reset;
- removal of administrator privileges;
- suspension of system access;
- volunteer management action;
- contractual action;
- governance action;
- investigation;
- regulatory or law-enforcement reporting.
The response should be proportionate to the circumstances.
125. Related Al-Waris Foundation Policies
This policy should be read alongside:
- Constitution;
- Data Protection and UK GDPR Policy;
- Confidentiality Policy;
- Records Retention and Disposal Policy;
- Financial Controls and Reserves Policy;
- Anti-Fraud, Bribery and Corruption Policy;
- Risk Management Policy;
- Serious Incident Reporting Policy;
- Whistleblowing Policy;
- Social Media and Digital Communications Policy;
- Photography, Video and Beneficiary Consent Policy;
- Safeguarding Children Policy;
- Safeguarding Adults at Risk Policy;
- Procurement and Purchasing Policy;
- Fundraising Policy.
126. Review
This policy will be reviewed:
- at least annually;
- following a significant cyber incident;
- following a material personal-data breach;
- following major changes to the charity's technology infrastructure;
- following introduction of significant new systems;
- where security controls are found to be inadequate;
- following relevant legal, regulatory or cybersecurity developments.
127. Approval
Version: 2.0 Status: Approved Approved by: Board of Trustees Approval date: 25/08/2026 Next scheduled review: 24/08/2027
